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Sunday, July 26, 2020 | History

2 edition of Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior found in the catalog.

Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior

Louis Kaplow

Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior

by Louis Kaplow

  • 320 Want to read
  • 38 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Law enforcement -- Economic aspects -- Mathematical models.

  • Edition Notes

    StatementLouis Kaplow, Steven Shavell.
    SeriesNBER working papers series -- working paper no. 3822, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 3822.
    ContributionsShavell, Steven, 1946-, National Bureau of Economic Research.
    The Physical Object
    Pagination28, A1-A8 p. ;
    Number of Pages28
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL22438625M

    Lie aversion and self-reporting in optimal law enforcement 6 May | Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 52, No. 2 Ex-ante evaluation of policy measures . Keywords: self reporting, permits, law enforcement, corruption, incentives, le-niency program, collusion. 1 Introduction The literature on law enforcement has long noted the widespread presence of self reporting of criminal acts. O⁄enders choose to admit their misdeeds directly when they know theCited by: 5.

    illegal cartels), 2) the literature on public enforcement of (generic) law, with a focus on the e⁄ects of self-reporting schemes, both for individual violators and groups of violators, 3) the literature on antitrust law enforcement, 3) the literature on the optimal design of leniency programmes, with an emphasis. The Journal of Law and Economics "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency" (with Kathryn Spier). NBER Working Paper No. w "Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes" (with Maxim Nikitin). Games and Economic Behavior, , pp.

    Strategic models of auditor-inspectee interaction have neglected implementation details in multiple-inspectee settings. With multiple inspectees, the target audit probability derived from the standard analysis can be implemented with sampling plans differing in the budgets committed to support them. Overly committed audit budgets tie up unneeded resources that could have been allocated for. Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science Farrington, D.P. Self-reports of deviant behavior: Predictive and stable? Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Stepping Stones to Adult Criminal Careers. In Development of Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior, D. Olweus, J. Block, and M.R. Yarrow, eds. New.


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Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior by Louis Kaplow Download PDF EPUB FB2

Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of.

Self-reporting--the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority--is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, such as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement, and we characterize the optimal by: Downloadable.

Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation. We add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement.

Optimal self-reporting schemes are characterized and are shown. Get this from a library. Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior. [Louis Kaplow; Steven Shavell; National Bureau of Economic Research.]. Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior Louis Kaplow, Steven Shavell.

NBER Working Paper No. (Also Reprint No. r) Issued in August NBER Program(s):Law and Economics Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority -- is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation.

Optimal law enforcement with self-reporting of behavior. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, [] (OCoLC) Material Type: Document, Internet resource: Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File: All Authors / Contributors: Louis Kaplow; Steven Shavell; National Bureau of Economic Research.

Downloadable (with restrictions). Self-reporting--the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority--is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, such as in the context of environmental and safety regulation.

The authors add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement and they characterize the optimal. In the n-act model, given any enforcement scheme (involving p > 0) without self-reporting, there exists a scheme with self-reporting under which behavior is the same but enforcement costs are lower.

At this point, we can determine the optimal ex ante sanctions by maximizing (16) over the r, where the p, are determined by (15). OPTIMAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WITH SELF-REPORTING OF BEHAVIOR ABSTRACT Self-reporting -- the reporting by parties of their own behavior to an enforcement authority --is a commonly observed aspect of law enforcement, as in the context of environmental and safety regulation.

We add self-reporting to the model of the. We consider a model of optimal law enforcement according to which self-reporting may be considered in mitigation.

After committing a crime, individuals get a private update of their probability of. The authors add self-reporting to the model of the control of harmful externalities through probabilistic law enforcement and they characterize the optimal scheme.

Self-reporting offers two. Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Political Economy, vol.().

Accuracy in the Determination of Liability (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 37, (). 6: The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law 1. Introduction Public enforcement of law—the use of governmental agents to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules—is a subject of obvious importance.

Police and prosecutors en-deavor to solve crimes and to punish criminals, regulators attempt to control violations. Audits Becker, G Bentham, J Bribery Corruption Criminal law Deterrence Efficiency wages Fairness Fault-based liability Fines Harm Imprisonment Incapacitation Principal and agent Public enforcement of law Safety regulations Sanctions Self-reporting Settlements.

This article surveys the economic analysis of five primary fields of law: property law; liability for accidents; contract law; litigation; and public enforcement and criminal law.

It also briefly considers some criticisms of the economic analysis of law. Economic analysis of law involves two elements: prediction of behavior in response to legal rules, assuming that actors are forward-looking and rational, and evaluation of outcomes in relation to well-articulated measures of social welfare.

Thus, in its general description, the view adopted in analyzing law is the standard one of economics. Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information.

Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior. Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension.

Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. Punishing Repeat Offenders More Author: Steven Shavell. The socially-optimal level of deterrence can be obtained at zero cost when the externalities associated with the harmful activities are not too high.

Without leniency for self-reporting, the enforcement cost is strictly positive and there is underdeterrence of harmful activities relative to the first-best level. 2 For other surveys of the theory of public enforcement, see Garoupa () and Mookherjee ().

For surveys of empirical research on law enforcement and crime, see Eide () and Levitt and Miles (), and for a survey of empirical research on enforcement of environmental regulation, see Cohen (, pp.

Public Enforcement of Law The enforcement authority’s problem is to maximize social welfare by choosing enforcement expenditures or, equivalently, a probability of detection, the level of sanctions and their form (a fine, prison term, or combination), and the rule of liability (strict or fault-based).

The theory of optimal public enforcement of law also helps to explain why society uses the sanction of imprisonment when it does—for the category of harmful acts labeled criminal, notably, for theft, robbery, rape, murder, and so forth.

31 Because such acts cause substantial harm, yet often are detected with a low probability, the magnitudes Cited by: The conventional economic literature on law enforcement provides no satisfactory explanation for the enforcement policies in the field of environmental regulation, safety regulation and health regulation.

In these fields enforcement usually applies administrative law sanctions and is characterized primarily by advice, persuasion and by: 4.The result here is related to but distinct from self-reporting of behavior in Kaplow and Shavell (), who show that permitting criminals to turn themselves in for the certainty equivalent of an expected penalty can save on the cost of law enforcement without affecting deterrence (see also Innes,Innes,Gerlach, ).

Here Author: Alexander Lundberg.